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ABSTRACT 
At its core, this project analyzes the interactions between state non-discrimination laws and 
the socioeconomic status of same-sex households in the United States. There is a large body of work 
examining the earnings gap for sexual minorities, but there is a dearth in studies looking at the effect 
of such protective laws. Using annual American Community Survey (ACS) data from 2000 to 2016, 
we examine the personal total income, household income, and unemployment in the ten states 
experiencing relevant reform. This study has two main findings. First, we confirm that sexual 
minorities experience substantial earnings differences, finding that lesbian women experience an 
income premium of 32.2 percent and gay men face an income penalty of 21.4 percent. Second, we 
find that non-discrimination laws seem to be decreasing the pay gap in both directions, shrinking the 
lesbian premium by 6.7 percent and the gay penalty by 12.1 percent. While we are unable to say these 
effects are causal, in the context of a history of wage penalties for gay males and wage premiums for 
lesbian women, protective reforms are positively and strongly correlated with closing the lesbian and 
gay income gap. From these main findings we are left with additional questions including: why does 
the lesbian premium exist, and why do protective reforms seem to chip away at it? While we review 
some relevant theories and offer our own, in the end these findings remain a puzzle. 
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INTRODUCTION 
With the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964, social scientists began to look at the impact 
that greater inclusion to society had on individuals and the collective system. These studies showed 
how discrimination and inclusivity affected the welfare of individuals as well as the larger economy. 
Similar studies showed the extent and implications of the gender pay gap, beginning in the 1970’s. 
LGBT people are in a similar place of rapidly changing social status, and there is much to be learned 
from a closer examination. While there is sizable discourse about LGBT discrimination, the impact 
of anti-discrimination laws is less studied. 
This study examines the ten states where legislative protections were added within the period 
of 2000 to 2016. We use data from the ACS, which surveys roughly 1% of the population annually. 
The variables are the same as are available in the Census, and the ACS is publicly accessible through 
the ACS Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS). It is by far the largest survey of its kind. While there 
is not a question which directly asks one’s sexual orientation, those living in same-sex households 
can be identified. While this method comes with its own complications, it is the most widely used 
data set for analyzing the demographics of lesbian and gay (LG) Americans and allows researchers 
to study large numbers of an otherwise elusive population.  
The goal of this research is to identify the effect of sexual orientation anti-discrimination 
legislation by comparing indicators of economic success for the LG population in ten states. For this 
paper, the factors most closely looked at are income and unemployment. This research adds to the 
discourse by examining discrepancies in pay and unemployment rates across a period of legislative 
change and controlling for socio-demographic factors.  
Using their “global barometer of gay rights scorecard,” Dicklitch, Thompson, and Yost (2016) 
describe five distinct relevant aspects to the status of sexual minorities: “constitutional protection of 
homosexuals, de facto (civil and political) persecution of homosexuals, level of gay rights advocacy, 
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protection of socioeconomic rights of homosexuals, and societal persecution of homosexuals.” This 
research examines what Dicklitch, Thompson and Yost call socioeconomic rights of homosexuals. 
The critical population for this study are same-sex partners, both married and unmarried. An 
"unmarried partner" can be of the same-sex or of the opposite sex of the householder and is an adult 
who is unrelated to the householder, but shares living quarters and has a close personal relationship 
with the householder (U.S. Census Bureau). This sample is compared to a population that is in an 
opposite-sex marriage or partnership controlling for exogenous demographic factors.  
Income is an indicator of available resources and can be compared to those with otherwise 
similar qualifications. A similar comparison can be made with respect to unemployment. These are 
common measures of socioeconomic status, and the research literature generally finds a substantial 
earnings premium for lesbian women and penalty for gay men. 
To date, there is no explicit federal protection for LGBT people against Sexual Orientation or 
Gender Identity (SOGI) discrimination in the U.S., and only 22 states and the District of Columbia 
maintain laws protecting individuals on the basis of sexual orientation. Using ACS data to examine 
policy changes in ten states throughout 17 years, this study aims to examine how these policies 
interact with lesbian and gay socioeconomic status. Overall, we find that such non-discrimination 
policies counteract the preexisting lesbian and gay earnings gaps. While we are able to offer a number 
of theories, we are unable to explain this effect. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Acceptance of LGBT people has shifted dramatically in the last twenty-five years. Historical 
data from the General Social Survey show that 72 percent of adults in 1991 considered homosexual 
behavior as “always wrong,” whereas in 2010 that share had fallen to 44 percent (Smith 2011). 
Conversely, the proportion of adults who support gay marriage grew from 37 percent in 2007 to 62 
percent in 2017 (Pew Research Center 2017b).  
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Earnings Gaps 
Beginning with Lee Badgett’s (1995) econometric study of the effects of sexual orientation 
on earnings, a growing body of research has attempted to explore sexual orientation earnings 
differences. Almost all studies have found a gay male penalty after controlling for other characteristics 
(Carpenter 2007; Klawitter 2011). Most studies have found a lesbian female premium (Jepsen 2007). 
Marieka Klawitter (2015) performs a meta-analysis of thirty-one studies finding an average earnings 
penalty of 11 percent for gay men and an earnings premium of 9 percent for lesbian women (Klawitter 
2015). There is a wide range of estimates, though, with the endpoints of the range showing penalties 
for lesbians and no significant effect for gays. She also finds a strong relationship between the 
approaches and data in a study and its findings, suggesting that this is why we see such a large range 
of findings. In particular, choice of dataset, choice of controls, measure of income, measure of sexual 
orientation, and methods could explain the wide variation of findings. 
One of the few studies to explicitly examine the interaction between law and discrimination 
is Baumle and Poston (2011). While they find an initial gay male penalty of 12.5 percent, in states 
with anti-discrimination laws the gap narrows to about 9.9 percent. They do not find such a shift for 
lesbian women but do find that lesbians earn a significant and large premium of 3.5 to 9 percent. 
Using 1990 census data instead of 2000, (Klawitter 1998) finds that an anti-discrimination law had 
no statistically significant effect on earnings.  
In addition to their findings about the interaction between reform and income, Buamle and 
Poston find that the lesbian earnings premium persists even when controlling for part-time work and 
the presence of children. This is an important finding because it challenges prevailing theories that 
lesbian women earn more because they are less likely to have children or work part-time (Badgett 
2001; Badgett 1995). Baumle (2009) suggests that it is possible, however, that employers perceive 
lesbians to have a greater labor force attainment than heterosexual women.  
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Baumle and Poston’s study (2011), which to our knowledge is the first to assess state anti-
discrimination policies across a multitude of states and years, suggests that an important factor in the 
socioeconomic status of sexual minorities is legal rights. In addition to the presence of an anti-
discrimination law, their study also incorporates state level controls such as the presence of a sodomy 
law, concentration of same-sex couples, and religious beliefs. In using census 1990 and census 2000 
data, however, they are unable to track changes before and after a law, as we do here. 
This study argues that those living in states without an anti-discrimination law could choose 
to avoid disclosing their sexual orientation and thereby avoid discrimination in the workplace. They 
point to the findings of Badgett (2001) that gays and lesbians were more likely to disclose their sexual 
orientation in the workplace when an employer had a non-discrimination policy in place. This 
suggests that individuals are more likely to disclose sexual orientation in environments where they 
feel protected. Just as race and gender discrimination have their own respective set of intricacies and 
intersections, so too does sexual orientation discrimination. Klawitter (2015) points to these 
complexities as an explanation for the wide spread in findings. The variability of findings, in part, 
comes as a consequence of the complexities of the data. Sexual orientation is not as easily perceived 
as race or gender. This further leads to intricacies in the ways in which individuals identify themselves, 
but also the ways in which the Census identifies them. This will be discussed in more detail in the 
methods section. 
It is often posited that changing attitudes towards sexual orientation have resulted in a 
reduction of discrimination (Clarke and Sevak 2013). Most recently, Carpenter and Eppink (2017) 
find that, along with lesbian women, gay men earn a 10 percent income premium over their 
heterosexual counterparts. They suggest a number of reasons that would explain this finding, but 
notably, reject the hypothesis that increasingly accepting attitudes towards sexual minorities are 
responsible for these findings.  
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First, they suggest it is not clear why improved attitudes towards LGBT would produce an 
earnings premium. Second, they find that gay men have significantly lower employment rates than 
comparable heterosexual men. This is inconsistent with a decrease in discrimination. Third, unlike 
their findings for males, Carpenter and Eppink find a lesbian earnings premium which remains in line 
with other studies’ estimates. If improved attitudes of LGBT are responsible for increasing gay 
earnings, would they not do the same for lesbian earnings? Fourth, increased acceptance has not been 
universal, and many sexual minorities have faced backlash to the legislative gains sexual minorities 
have made. These findings suggest there is more to the socioeconomic progress of American sexual 
minorities than increased acceptance. Carpenter and Eppink argue that equality in the right to 
marriage accounts for these differences. 
In line with Carpenter and Eppink’s findings that gay males no longer face an earnings 
premium, there is reason to believe that the status of sexual minorities is changing. Klawitter (2015) 
finds that over time, these gaps—a penalty for males and premium for females—are converging 
towards zero. While she declines to say with certainty, she points to decreasing discrimination and 
study design as potential reasons for this.  
Madden and Kyei (2013) suggest that gender norms, not discrimination, is the primary cause 
for the gay and lesbian earnings gaps. Using the gender composition of a worker’s occupation as 
proxy for the gender “typicality” of his or her unmeasured characteristics, Madden and Kyei posit 
sexual minorities of different genders possess differing “unmeasured gender-linked characteristics” 
that ultimately affect earnings. This hypothesis conjectures that the labor market rewards 
stereotypically masculine traits such as strength and risk-willingness. If lesbian women possess more 
of these traits than do heterosexual women, they would be rewarded by the labor market. Conversely, 
if gay men possess less of these traits than do heterosexual men, they would be punished by the labor 
market.  
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Citing evidence that gay men are more likely to disclose their sexual orientation than lesbian 
women, and that they may face greater degrees of discrimination, Madden and Kyei suggest a second 
hypothesis of “greater bias against gay men.” If biases against homosexuality are greater for gay men 
than they are lesbian women, then gay men would face an earnings penalty and lesbian women might 
have earnings more equivalent to their heterosexual counterparts. On its own, however, this theory 
cannot explain a lesbian earnings premium. Madden and Kyei suggest a third contributor is household 
gender roles amongst homosexual couples.  
Most studies which examine the pay-gap between same-sex and different-sex couples have 
been unable to prove discrimination. While we observe gay male couples earning less than their 
heterosexual counterparts, for example, there are various factors involved. Although researchers 
attempt to control for those differences, most cannot directly examine an individual’s experience with 
discrimination. Convincing accounts of sexual minorities’ experience with discrimination are made 
by the few audit studies which exist on the matter. 
Audit Studies on Hiring Rates of Sexual Minorities 
Weichselbaumer (2003) conducted a correspondence test in Austria’s greater Vienna area of 
Austria, sending out 613 pairs of resumes with female names for open positions. One resume in each 
pair was assigned volunteer experience for a gay or lesbian rights organization, while the other was 
assigned volunteer experience for a non-profit or cultural center. Weichselbaumer found that, to a 
statistically significant level, signaling lesbian orientation reduces one’s rate of invitation to be 
interviewed by 12 to 13 percentage points. This is to say that in a given pair of resumes, the one 
assigned lesbian was invited to interview 38 percent of the time, while the one assigned straight was 
invited back 50 percent of the time (Weichselbaumer 2003). These findings correspond to Adam’s 
(1981) findings of an 11 percent reduction of invitation rates for lesbian females in the Toronto. 
Drydakis (2009) follows suit of Weichselbaumer (2003) and Adam (1981), sending 1714 pairs 
of male resumes to job openings in Athens, Greece one marked with volunteer work for a gay 
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organization, the other marked with volunteer work for an environmental group. Of the 696 postings 
which sent out an invitation for interview, 230 invited both the gay and straight applicant, 457 invited 
just the straight applicant, and in just nine cases was only the gay applicant invited. This equates to a 
64.3 percent rate of net discrimination1 against the gay resumes, despite coming three years after laws 
prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation went into effect under the European 
Union's Employment Equality Directive. 
Drydakis also notes sexual minorities far too often live with the consequences of 
discrimination thinking that it is normal. Drydakis further notes that few employers understand what 
constitutes sexual orientation discrimination and underscores the importance of such research to 
policy and social science. 
Tilcsik’s 2011 study marks the first large-scale audit study in the U.S. and adds three major 
findings to the discourse, as well as a nuanced framework for understanding sexual orientation 
discrimination.  First, the study provides direct evidence of discrimination against gay men, finding 
that in 3538 resumes to 1769 job postings, gay men were about 40 percent less likely to be given an 
interview than the heterosexual applicant. Tilcsik calls this result as being consistent with other 
indicators of discrimination against sexual minorities, and of a similar magnitude to the gap between 
black and white applicants (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004; Badgett et al. 2009). 
Moreover, conducting the study across seven states in distinct regions, Tilcsik finds regional 
differences. Employers in the South and Midwest show stronger discrimination than those in the West 
and Northeast. Perhaps most notable for our own work is the finding that those employers in states 
and counties with relevant anti-discrimination laws were significantly less likely to discriminate. 
Lastly, Tilscik identifies employers who emphasize the importance of stereotypically 
masculine traits as being especially likely to discriminate against gay men. Tilcsik takes this finding 
to suggest that, discrimination “is partly rooted in specific stereotypes and cannot be completely 
                                                        
1 Calculated as the number of times a minority applicant was treated less favorably on a single type of firm behavior 
than the majority applicant. Then the number of times the majority applicant was treated less favorably was subtracted. 
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reduced to a general antipathy against gay employees” (2011, p. 616). Tilcsik further proposes that, 
viewed in the framework of Arrow’s (1973) statistical discrimination, this finding shows that 
individuals have the practice of extrapolating beliefs about a group to the character of a member of 
that group. More specifically, Tilcsik suggests that if some employers believe masculine traits to be 
associated with better job performance, and if those same employers believe gay men are less 
masculine, then we would expect discrimination. This finding shows that discrimination against 
lesbians and gays does not live in its own realm of sexual orientation discrimination, but rather should 
be viewed in the same ecosystem as discrimination stemming from existing power hierarchies and 
cultural norms (such as those measured in gender). From the findings of his study Tilcsik pushes us 
to understand ascriptive inequality: how members of dominant groups perceive those in subordinate 
groups, especially those characteristics related to inequality-generating decisions. 
Policy Review 
At the federal level, sexual orientation has only been considered a protected form of identity 
when interpreted as part of sex and gender. A major change occurred in 2014 when President Obama 
signed Executive Order 13672 expanding anti-discrimination policies for LGBT people serving as 
federal and federally contracted employees. A policy established in 2015 by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), as well as a ruling in April 2017 by the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals, label sexual orientation discrimination as part of sex discrimination, making it illegal as part 
of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. However, EEOC rulings are not binding on private 
employers, and federal courts may rule differently.  
Furthermore, the federal policy’s future remains unclear. In the summer of 2017, the Justice 
department began to reverse the Obama era interpretation of Title VII. In February of 2018, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the Justice Department’s argument and 
became the second appeals court to rule that the Civil Rights Act should be extended to include sexual 
orientation. However, a third appellate court in Atlanta has ruled differently, perhaps positioning an 
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appeal to be taken up by the Supreme Court which could make title VII a federal discrimination ban. 
Currently there is no legislation in the United States that explicitly bans discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation.  
In lieu of a federal non-discrimination law, there exist many state laws which protect 
employees from unfair treatment based on their sexual orientation. At the conclusion of 2016, 19 
states and the District of Columbia had laws protecting individuals form discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation and gender identity, while an additional three states had protections on the basis 
of sexual orientation only (Movement Advancement Project 2018). While the level of protection can 
vary substantially, employment non-discrimination laws protect LGBT people from being fired, not 
hired, or discriminated against in the workplace by private employers on the basis of sexual 
orientation or gender identity. Most large cities have at least some protections, and about 50 U.S. 
municipalities in 15 states have added LGBT non-discrimination measures since 2015, when same-
sex marriage was legalized nationwide. The Movement Advancement Project (2018) finds that 50 
percent LGBT people live in states prohibiting employment discrimination based on sexual 
orientation. They also find that an additional portion of the population is protected by laws for state 
employees or by local ordinances. Twenty-eight states have no employment non-discrimination laws. 
METHOD 
Data Selection 
This study uses data from the 1-year American Community Survey Public Use Microdata 
Sample. These data are composed of microdata, such that each record is an individual person. In our 
analysis we used structures of data which are organized by households, making it possible to study 
characteristics of people in the context of their families or other co-residents. Beginning in 2005, the 
ACS data represents 1 percent of the national population. From 2000 to 2004, there is some variance 
in the sample size, and the 2000 data are not the ACS but the 5 percent sample of the U.S. Census 
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(Table A1). We begin our analysis in 2000 because it marks the first year in which annual data are 
available and end at the last available dataset in 2016.  
With our data set spanning 17 years, we chose to examine every state which had an applicable 
legislative change within that period except for Utah (Hasenbush et al. 2014).2 These represent the 
12th through 22nd states to add sexual orientation non-discrimination laws. Because the remaining 28 
states are likely to be less progressive, our sample is on the progressive side of the political spectrum. 
We determine an individual’s sexual orientation as most researchers have done, by examining 
the two questions pertaining to sex and relationship to head of household. We can assume that the 
relationship between two people is spouse/partner if a person chooses “husband/wife” or “unmarried 
partner.” It is unlikely that roommates and housemates misidentify themselves as partners because 
there is a response choice for that type of relationship. Knowing who identify themselves as spouses/ 
partners, we can then use the sex of partners to distinguish between those in same-sex and different-
sex marriages/partnerships. Beginning in Census 2000, we are able to discern four classes of 
unmarried cohabitating couples: same-sex male couples, same-sex female couples, unmarried 
different-sex couples, and married different-sex couples. Starting in 2013, the ACS data distinguish 
between married and unmarried same-sex couples, bringing the number of classes to six. 
We limit our sample to those who fall into these four classes (or six beginning in 2013). We 
further limit our sample to match the properties of the measured labor force, including only civilians 
who are 16 years or older and are not in institutions such as prisons or mental hospitals. In the few 
cases in which income was negative or in which it was zero, income was set to equal 0.1.3 There were 
also a handful of respondents which were allocated as same-sex married-couple but missing valid 
responses for their sex or relationship to householder, so these cases were removed from the sample. 
                                                        
2 In March of 2015, Utah made it illegal to discriminate based on sexual-orientation. It was decided that this was too 
recent of a change to effectively measure in this study. 
3 5,211 of the 3,421,589 observations had a personal total income of less than zero, or 0.15 percent. An additional 
36,274 have a personal total income equal to zero, or 1.2 percent. 0.02 percent had a household income of less than 
zero, and 0.02 percent less than or equal to zero. 
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Challenges 
The Census and its related surveys such as the ACS, collect information about the 
relationships of those living in households. On the ACS, a householder and others living in the home 
are identified, along with their relationship to the householder. Logically, if the householder marks 
that he or she lives with a partner or spouse of the same-sex, these two people can be considered to 
be a same-sex couple. This is how we derive our sample population of lesbian and gay Americans.  
A more straightforward way to ascertain information regarding one’s sexual orientation would 
be a question that asks directly. There are surveys in the U.S. such as the General Social Survey (GSS) 
which ask questions to individuals regarding a range of demographic factors, including their sexual 
orientation. Since 2008 when the GSS began asking about one’s sexual orientation,4 the sample size 
has been around 2000 respondents per year. In general, this is a large enough sample to be considered 
nationally representative, but when considering a minority group, it is too small. In 2016, for example, 
46 responded “gay lesbian or homosexual,” 56 responded “bisexual”, and 1641 responded 
“heterosexual or straight” (Smith et al. 2016). Given our interest in looking at policy changes within 
a state, these numbers easily become low single digits. While the GSS can provide valuable insights 
into LGB trends, a study of policy changes requires a much larger data set. The only nationally 
representative and substantial surveys containing a specific question on sexual orientation exist in the 
UK and Canada. In the U.S, we must infer sexual orientation through cohabitation properties in the 
ACS. This method comes with its challenges. 
Procedural Changes 
First there is the challenge that procedural changes to the collection of data have significant 
impacts on data. In our data set ranging from 2000-2016, significant changes to the collection of data 
                                                        
4 Prior to 2008 the General Social Survey asked questions about same-sex sexual behavior, but not explicitly about 
sexual orientation.   
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took place in 2000, 2008 and again in 2013. It is important to understand these definitional intricacies 
to properly analyze the data.  
In 1990 the Census added the category of unmarried partner to its question regarding 
relationship to householder. If the participant reported their relationship as same-sex, unmarried 
partners were allowed but married couples were edited in such a way that the sex of one individual 
reflected an opposite-sex arrangement (File 2016). In 2000, this practice was changed so that instead 
of changing the sex of one of the partners, the relationship would be changed from married to 
unmarried partner. While this change does not occur in the midst of our sample, it is important to 
understand the composition of our sample and its intricacies. For example, Gates and Steinberger 
(2010), find about .25 percent of different-sex married couples miscode the sex of a spouse, and 30 
percent of identified same-sex couples in the ACS are in fact misclassified different-sex married 
couples. In using this data set, is important to heed caution due to its imperfections. 
Between 2007 and 2008 two categories of change occurred: (1) processing and editing 
changes and (2) formatting changes to the questionnaire (O'Connell et al. 2008). In regard to 
processing and editing, the system of transcribing paper responses was somewhat automated and 
improved. Additionally, how surveys with multiple boxes checked for sex and relationship were also 
treated differently. Prior to 2008, multiple marks for sex would be edited to “male,” and surveys with 
relationships marked as “husband/wife” as well as another response were marked as “husband/wife.” 
Starting in 2008, these questions with multiple markings were changed to be considered left blank. 
Perhaps the most impactful change that occurred between 2007 and 2008 was the format 
change from a grid-based questionnaire to a sequential ordering of questionnaire items. Beginning in 
2008, all core demographic responses for a single person were in one vertical column with a distinct 
sequential numbering of questions. In 2007, these items were spread over two pages with less specific 
instructions and without a numbering system. A preliminary evaluation indicated significantly higher 
proportion of persons who reported themselves as male than as female in the grid format (O'Connell 
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et al. 2008).  Additionally, the 2008 form instructed the respondent to mark only one box each for the 
relationship and the sex items, while prior space limitations prevented this instruction from being 
included.  
While the estimate of same-sex unmarried partners does not change much between 2007 and 
2008, the number of couples reporting themselves as same-sex spouses declined from 341,000 in 
2007 to 150,000 in 2008, or 27 percent of all same-sex couples in 2008. O’Connell et al. (2008) credit 
these changes for the dramatic drop and say that it marks an improvement in data collection and 
avoiding erroneous responses. In analyzing the data, again, it is important to note the method and 
changes to the procedure of data collection. 
Lastly, in 2013 the ACS stopped recoding those who marked themselves as same-sex married 
couples from married to unmarried partners (U.S. Census Bureau 2014). Along with this change came 
the introduction of a Same-sex Married Couple variable “SSMC.” 
Data Limitations 
To begin, the Census cannot identify those who identify as LGB but rather those who 
cohabitate with someone of the same-sex. This means that our data only speaks to a portion of the 
population that is living in a partnership with someone—single people who identify as LGB cannot 
be discovered through the current means of the ACS. One can imagine that the partnered segment of 
the population differs from the segment of those who are single (non-partnered people account for 
42% of the population) (Pew Research Center 2017a). 
A statistical problem arises in the analysis of a relatively small critical population: a low rate 
of random error in a large group (opposite-sex married couples) creates large errors in the estimates 
for a small group (same-sex married couples). With 56 million opposite-sex married households, up 
to 0.5% have been found to misreport a spouse’s sex—about 280,000 households (File 2016). Adding 
these 280,000 households in error to same-sex households is hugely significant considering the 
estimate of same-sex married couples is around 400,000. Krieger et al (2017) compared the sex 
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reported in the 2010 ACS with the Social Security record and found that about 57 percent of those 
reported as same-sex couples in the 2010 ACS are likely opposite-sex in the Social Security data file 
(Kreider, Bates, and Mayol-Garcia 2017). They identify this primarily as a consequence of mismarks 
by the respondent. 
Procedural changes to the Census and ACS have been proposed which would bring this 
number down. In testing of the 2016 ACS census, putting the survey online, adding automated 
formatting (such as referring to house members by their names), and prompting the respondent to 
check their answer, were found to reduce this number from .5 percent to .03 percent (Kreider, Bates, 
and Mayol-Garcia 2017). While the percentages are small, this reduction represents a substantial 
decrease in erroneous responses and would bring the number of misreported same-sex married 
couples down from approximately 280,000 to around 16,800. 
Despite the challenges unique to the data available in the U.S. and the presence of “better” 
data elsewhere such as the UK or Canada, this kind of policy-based analysis is uniquely compelling 
in the U.S. given states’ abilities to serve as “laboratories of democracy.”5 This nature of governance 
allows us to uniquely isolate state anti-discrimination legislation as a variable, and it allows us to 
observe multiple instances of legislative change across many states. 
MODELS 
Our analysis focus on three related models of increasing complexity, each applied to three 
dependent variables: LogPersonalTotalIncome, LogHouseholdIncome, and Unemployment.  
(1) DependentVariablei = η + α*SameSexHHi + εi  
(2) DependentVariablei = η + α*SameSexHHi + λ*Reform + β*DemographicTraitsi + εi  
(3) DependentVariablei = η + α*SameSexHHi + λ*Reform + φ*SameSexHH*Reform + 
β*DemographicTraitsi + εi   
                                                        
5 "Laboratories of democracy" is a phrase popularized by Justice Louis Brandeis in 1932 to describe how a "state may, 
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country." 
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SameSexHH is a dummy variable equaling one when the couple is identified as a same-sex 
couple, and zero if not. For any given state, Reform is a dummy variable equaling one for the years 
following the implementation of a state-wide sexual orientation anti-discrimination law. If a law was 
passed in 2007, for example, Reform will equal zero for the years 2000-2007, and one for years 2008-
2016. The reason we apply this variable in the year following legislation as opposed to the actual year 
of legislation is because of time differences of implementation across states. Furthermore, it is 
unlikely that a given reform will have taken effect in the year of its passing. This equation is applied 
separately to men and women to highlight the gender-based differences in labor market outcomes.  
DemographicTraits is a set of sociodemographic factors, including age, race and ethnicity, 
and educational attainment. Also included are a set of year and state dummy variables which control 
for differences measured over time and across states. There is also a control for unemployment, as 
well as one for reform. The last year and the last state dummy will be undefined because of 
singularities. Likewise, for each state, one control year will not be listed because it is captured in 
PostReform (Table A7). The first model of each dependent variable includes just the SameSexHH 
variable, the second adds DemographicTraits, and the third adds interaction terms between 
SameSexHH and Reform. 
The models for LogPersonalTotalIncome and LogHouseholdIncome (columns (1) through (6) 
in Table 1 and Table 2) are estimated as ordinary least squares (OLS) models and vary only in the 
dependent variable. The models for Unemployment (columns (7) through (9) in Table 1 and Table 2) 
differ in that they are logistic regressions with the binomial unemployment as the dependent variable. 
This term is zero for those employed and one for those unemployed. The set of demographic traits 
remains identical across dependent variables except for the exclusion of unemployment as a control 
in the income analysis. For each of the three dependent variables, the independent variables of interest 
are the interaction terms between SameSexHH and Reform. The coefficients of α indicate the 
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perceived difference in income and unemployment for couples based on sexual orientation. The 
coefficients of φ indicate the differences pertaining to same-sex couples in respect to reform. 
RESULTS 
Tables 1 and 2 present the results for personal total income (columns 1 through 3), household 
income (columns 4 through 6), and unemployment (columns 7 through 9). Table 1 is based on females 
and Table 2 is based on males. Omitted are the dummies for states and years, but other 
sociodemographic factors are included to serve as points of comparison.  
For ease in reading these results, all coefficients of columns (1) through (6) are described as 
percent effects using the standard formula: %∆𝑦	 = 	 (𝑒ß) − 1) ⋅ 100 where y is a given dependent 
variable and ß1 is the coefficient of an independent variable. Coefficients of columns (7) through (9) 
are described here as odds instead of log of odds.  
Personal Total Income 
Before including the interaction term, in model (2) we find that lesbian women face a 32.2 
percent earnings premium. In other words, from 2000 to 2016, we expect a woman in a same-sex 
household to earn 32.2 percent more than her heterosexual counterpart. Men living in a same-sex 
household from 2000-2016 are expected to face a 21.4 percent earnings penalty. Note that these data 
refer to annual income, so they reflect differences in both pay rates and total hours worked. 
In model (3) we include the interaction between being in a same sex household and being 
protected by state anti-discrimination legislation. These findings show that lesbian women see their 
earnings premium decline by 6.7 percentage points in the years following reform, despite earning 
38.3 percent more than their heterosexual counterparts in the years prior to reform. In the years 
following a reform, gay men earn an additional 12.1 percent while earning 26.5 percentage points 
less than their heterosexual counterpart prior to reform. This is to say that for those in same-sex 
households, women lose 6.7 percent of their premium given a reform, while men gain back 12.1 
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percent. All of the numbers reported above for personal total income are significant at the 1 percent 
level.  
Household Income  
While lesbian women earn substantially more than heterosexual women, the household 
income for lesbians is 8.4 percent lower than that of heterosexual households. Lesbian households 
earn substantially less than heterosexual men.  
Males in same-sex households have a household income that is 12.1 percent greater than that 
of heterosexual households. Although gay men individually earn less than their heterosexual 
counterparts, this premium is expected because women in different-sex households earn around half 
as much as their partners. 
Before reform, household income for gay men is 7.1 percent higher than that of the 
heterosexual household, and in the years following reform that premium rises by another 7.4 
percentage points. The lesbian household income in the period following reform increases by 2.0 
percent (significant to the 5 percent level). Unless otherwise noted, all of the findings for household 
income reported above are significant at the 1 percent level.  
Unemployment 
It appears that lesbian women have slightly greater odds at being unemployed while gay men 
have substantially greater odds. Overall, women in same-sex households are found to have odds of 
unemployment 5.7 percent greater than similar heterosexual women (significant at the 10 percent 
level). Prior to reform, we find that being in a lesbian household as compared to a heterosexual 
household, a woman’s odds of being unemployed are 10.8 percent greater (significant at the 10 
percent level). After reform, the odds for lesbian women decrease by 7.4 percent compared to before 
(statistically insignificant). Compared to their pre-reform odds, this is notable improvement.  
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For males in same-sex households, the odds of being unemployed are 34.6 percent greater 
than the odds of similar males in heterosexual households (significant at the 1 percent level). Prior to 
reform, gay males have odds 27.0% greater than heterosexual men (significant at the 1 percent level), 
while following reform the odds are 5.8% greater (statistically insignificant). These findings are 
noteworthy but should also be put into perspective: for example, the odds of being unemployed as a 
black male are 108 percent greater than those of a white male. 
State-Level Analysis 
Looking at the trends across the sample of states gives us further insight into the results (Table 
3). As it pertains to income, this table reports initial pre-reform gaps and overall gaps. The post reform 
column is to be considered in sum with the pre-reform column. For example, Females in Maryland 
experience a 34.5 percent personal total income premium in the pre-reform period, but that premium 
declines by 13.9 percent post reform. Overall, they experience a 26.0 percent earnings premium. 
For female personal total income, all states show substantial and statistically significant pre-
reform premiums for same-sex households. Furthermore, the spread for pre-reform premiums is large, 
with a range of 22.3 percent (Maine) to 59.5 percent (New Mexico). Overall, in the entire 2000-2016 
period, the trend is similarly consistent for all states, with a range of at 23.6 percent (Iowa) to 39.4 
percent (Washington and Delaware). While the results are less uniformly significant, the post reform 
column also adds insight. All states show the premium decreasing, with a range of -2.4 percent (New 
York) to -18.6 percent (New Mexico). 
The results for personal total income for males are similar but in the opposite direction. Pre-
reform, males experience statistically significant penalties between -22.9 percent (in Maryland) and 
-36.7 percent (New Mexico). Overall, in the period from 2000-2016, males face an earnings penalty 
between -17.0 percent (New York) and -29.1 percent (Iowa). The post reform column show less 
significant but fairly uniform increases in earnings from 6.2 percent (Colorado) to 39.0 percent 
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(Maine). Notably exceptions of this trend are Iowa and Maryland. These findings are statistically 
significant at a higher incidence than are the findings for females.  
Household income tells a similar story, with lesbian pre-reform households earning between 
7.1 percent and 11.0 percent less. Overall, in the period 2000-2016, this trend is the same with a 
slightly bigger range of -3.4 percent to -11.0 percent. The post reform column shows that same-sex 
female households in most states earn a little back, but the findings are mostly insignificant.  
Same-sex male households experience less uniform penalties in pre-reform household 
income, but overall the trend is that these households earn a substantial income premium over 
different-sex couples. The post reform column is more uniformly significant than it is for women, 
and generally shows substantial increases in household income (again with the exception of Iowa and 
Maryland). 
Unemployment is reported in odds, and while the first and last columns are to be taken in 
isolation, the post reform column is again to be taken in sum with pre-reform. This means that, in the 
example of Maryland females, odds of unemployment are 3.7 percent higher pre-reform, and 1.7 
percent higher overall. In the period post reform, lesbian women have odds .97 times of those that 
they did prior to reform. The findings pertaining to unemployment are mostly statistically 
insignificant, but point to slightly higher odds for pre-reform lesbians, and generally decreased odds 
post reform. For males, the trend is similar, but effects seem to be larger. 
Check for Robustness 
It is likely that other variables influence the results of these models. To test robustness of these 
models, we create a sample that has been edited to “fake” a change in sexual orientation non-
discrimination laws. Looking at neighboring states with laws enacted in different years (e.g. New 
Mexico, 2003; Colorado, 2007), we hope to test whether our measure Reform is picking up other 
economic factors. In particular, we can look to the interaction terms SameSexHH*Reform, 
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Female*Reform, and SameSexHH*Reform*Female (Table A3)6. If our variable Reform was truly 
isolated from various economic effects, we would expect to see the “faked” data to show small and 
insignificant effects of reform. In the example of New Mexico and Colorado (Table A3), looking at 
these three interaction terms we note that there is in fact a sizable and significant effect of reform for 
all three dependent variables in the “faked” dataset. The test in Maryland and Delaware is less 
conclusive, likely because reform in Maryland took place in 2001, leaving only two years of data 
prior to reform. 
We also perform some checks to make sure our dataset composition seems reasonable. One 
such check is population sizes of same-sex households in our sample versus the 2010 census state-
level preferred estimates (Table A2). The estimates derived from our sample do not include weighting 
so are presented for rough comparisons only. Furthermore, the census preferred estimates are adjusted 
to account for those households that mismark the sex of their partner/spouse. 
  
                                                        
6 The sample used to test for robustness is not separated by gender. This means that the model includes a Sex (Female) 
independent variable and thus a triple interaction term SameSexHH*Reform*Female. 
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Females in 10 States 2000-2016
Dependent variable:
log(Personal Income) log(Household Income) Unemployment
OLS OLS logistic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(Intercept) 9.960*** 8.518*** 8.517*** 11.270*** 9.241*** 9.241*** -3.093*** -.620*** -.620***
(.002) (.019) (.019) (.001) (.008) (.008) (.004) (.052) (.052)
Same Sex HH .386*** .279*** .324*** -.015*** -.088*** -.100*** .013 .055* .103*
(.012) (.011) (.018) (.005) (.005) (.008) (.032) (.033) (.055)
Age .040*** .040*** .074*** .074*** -.065*** -.065***
(.001) (.001) (.0003) (.0003) (.002) (.002)
Age squared -.0003*** -.0003*** -.001*** -.001*** .0005*** .0005***
(.00001) (.00001) (.000003) (.000003) (.00002) (.00002)
Black .104*** .104*** -.141*** -.141*** .595*** .595***
(.006) (.006) (.002) (.002) (.014) (.014)
Am. Indian /
Alaska Native -.052*** -.052*** -.221*** -.220*** .670*** .670***
(.016) (.016) (.007) (.007) (.034) (.034)
Asian or
Pacific Islander -.100*** -.100*** -.042*** -.042*** .305*** .305***
(.006) (.006) (.003) (.003) (.017) (.017)
Other Race -.079*** -.079*** -.074*** -.074*** .244*** .244***
(.007) (.007) (.003) (.003) (.018) (.018)
Hispanic or
Latinx -.096*** -.096*** -.058*** -.058*** .297*** .297***
(.006) (.006) (.003) (.003) (.015) (.015)
Highschool .384*** .384*** .223*** .223*** -.578*** -.578***
(.006) (.006) (.003) (.003) (.014) (.014)
Some College .572*** .572*** .365*** .365*** -.774*** -.774***
(.006) (.006) (.003) (.003) (.014) (.014)
Associates
Degree .719*** .719*** .447*** .447*** -1.091*** -1.091***
(.007) (.007) (.003) (.003) (.018) (.018)
Bachelor's
Degree .971*** .971*** .689*** .689*** -1.226*** -1.226***
(.006) (.006) (.003) (.003) (.015) (.015)
Master's
Degree 1.218*** 1.218*** .821*** .821*** -1.463*** -1.463***
(.007) (.007) (.003) (.003) (.019) (.019)
Professional
Degree 1.551*** 1.551*** 1.100*** 1.100*** -1.572*** -1.572***
(.010) (.010) (.004) (.004) (.038) (.038)
Doctoral
Degree 1.477*** 1.477*** 1.014*** 1.014*** -1.658*** -1.658***
(.013) (.013) (.005) (.005) (.053) (.053)
Unemployment -3.688*** -3.688*** -.503*** -.503***
(.007) (.007) (.003) (.003)
Post Reform .007 .008 -.002 -.002 -.098*** -.096***
(.007) (.007) (.003) (.003) (.020) (.020)
Same Sex
HH*Reform -.069*** .020** -.074
(.023) (.010) (.068)
Observations 1,548,464 1,548,464 1,548,464 1,548,464 1,548,464 1,548,464 1,548,464 1,548,464 1,548,464
R2 .001 .238 .238 .00001 .237 .237
Adjusted R2 .001 .238 .238 .000004 .237 .237
Akaike Inf.
Crit. 553,047.900 527,404.700 527,405.600
F Statistic
957.387***
(df = 1;
1548462)
11,507.140***
(df = 42;
1548421)
11,239.810***
(df = 43;
1548420)
7.844***
(df = 1;
1548462)
11,482.550***
(df = 42;
1548421)
11,215.630***
(df = 43;
1548420)
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Omitted: Dummies for years and states
Table 1 Partnered Females Ag d 16 and Above in 10 States 2000-2016 
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Males in 10 States 2000-2016
Dependent variable:
log(Personal Income) log(Household Income) Unemployment
OLS OLS logistic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(Intercept) 10.653*** 8.883*** 8.884*** 11.246*** 9.351*** 9.352*** -3.178*** -1.667*** -1.666***
(.001) (.014) (.014) (.001) (.008) (.008) (.004) (.050) (.050)
Same Sex HH -.169*** -.255*** -.337*** .196*** .114*** .069*** .162*** .297*** .260***
(.010) (.009) (.015) (.006) (.005) (.009) (.032) (.032) (.056)
Age .058*** .058*** .066*** .066*** -.048*** -.048***
(.001) (.001) (.0003) (.0003) (.002) (.002)
Age squared -.001*** -.001*** -.001*** -.001*** .0005*** .0005***
(.00001) (.00001) (.000003) (.000003) (.00002) (.00002)
Black -.391*** -.391*** -.115*** -.115*** .727*** .727***
(.004) (.004) (.002) (.002) (.013) (.013)
Am. Indian /
Alaska Native -.346*** -.346*** -.199*** -.199*** .842*** .842***
(.012) (.012) (.007) (.007) (.031) (.031)
Asian or
Pacific Islander -.301*** -.301*** -.188*** -.188*** .135*** .135***
(.005) (.005) (.003) (.003) (.019) (.019)
Other Race -.150*** -.150*** -.092*** -.092*** .207*** .207***
(.005) (.005) (.003) (.003) (.018) (.018)
Hispanic or
Latinx -.131*** -.131*** -.122*** -.122*** -.053*** -.053***
(.004) (.004) (.002) (.002) (.015) (.015)
Highschool .290*** .290*** .213*** .213*** -.466*** -.466***
(.004) (.004) (.002) (.002) (.012) (.012)
Some College .472*** .472*** .380*** .380*** -.680*** -.680***
(.004) (.004) (.002) (.002) (.013) (.013)
Associates
Degree .523*** .523*** .421*** .421*** -.890*** -.890***
(.005) (.005) (.003) (.003) (.017) (.017)
Bachelor's
Degree .861*** .861*** .704*** .704*** -1.159*** -1.160***
(.004) (.004) (.002) (.002) (.014) (.014)
Master's
Degree 1.027*** 1.026*** .828*** .828*** -1.263*** -1.263***
(.005) (.005) (.003) (.003) (.019) (.019)
Professional
Degree 1.451*** 1.451*** 1.183*** 1.183*** -1.970*** -1.970***
(.006) (.006) (.004) (.004) (.037) (.037)
Doctoral
Degree 1.165*** 1.164*** .938*** .938*** -1.674*** -1.674***
(.007) (.007) (.004) (.004) (.042) (.042)
Unemployment -2.327*** -2.327*** -.609*** -.609***
(.005) (.005) (.003) (.003)
Post Reform .017*** .016*** -.0001 -.001 -.010 -.011
(.005) (.005) (.003) (.003) (.020) (.020)
Same Sex
HH*Reform .128
*** .071*** .056
(.019) (.011) (.068)
Observations 1,845,672 1,845,672 1,845,672 1,845,672 1,845,672 1,845,672 1,845,672 1,845,672 1,845,672
R2 .0002 .208 .208 .001 .240 .240
Adjusted R2 .0002 .208 .208 .001 .240 .240
Akaike Inf.
Crit. 620,961.800 594,698.500 594,699.800
F Statistic
284.523***
(df = 1;
1845670)
11,518.870***
(df = 42;
1845629)
11,252.390***
(df = 43;
1845628)
1,097.858***
(df = 1;
1845670)
13,857.870***
(df = 42;
1845629)
13,536.910***
(df = 43;
1845628)
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Omitted: Dummies for years and states
Table 2 Partnered Males Aged 16 and Above in 1  States 2000-2016 
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DISCUSSION 
The findings of this study are consistent with prior research indicating that lesbian women 
experience an earnings premium while gay men experience a penalty.  We find similar but smaller 
differences with unemployment. Furthermore, we hope to add to the discourse by shedding light on 
the interaction between protective legislation and these socioeconomic indicators, namely that anti-
discrimination laws appear to be strongly correlated with a shrinking earnings gap. We contend that 
this illuminates the importance of equality not just in the eyes of society but also equality in the eyes 
of the law. Most generally, our findings include a number of puzzles; namely, why do homosexual 
women not face the same discrimination that homosexual men do, and why do homosexual women 
seem to be hurt by anti-discrimination laws? 
First, the results of this study replicate others in that lesbian women experience an earnings 
premium while gay men experience an earnings penalty. Using 2000-2016 ACS data from ten states, 
we measure a lesbian earnings premium of 32.2 percent for personal total income, and a male penalty 
of 21.4 percent. There is also quite a substantial difference between states (Table 3). Compared to 
heterosexual households, the household income of gays is 12.1 percent greater, while for lesbians it 
is 8.4 percent lower. Household income results differ from personal income results by sexual 
orientation due to the pay gap between men and women.  
We also find that those living in same-sex households have greater odds of being unemployed. 
Gay men face unemployment at odds 34.6 percent greater than heterosexual men, while lesbian 
women have odds that are 5.7 percent greater than heterosexual women. These findings are significant 
at the 1 percent level and 10 percent level, respectively. 
Second, these findings show that the existence of legislative protections for sexual minorities 
is positively correlated to increased personal incomes for gay men and decreased personal incomes 
for lesbian women. We measure gay males to recover 12.1 percent of their earnings, while lesbian 
females lose 6.7 percent of their premium. The findings also show that household income for gay men 
 30 
increases by 6.4 percent given reform, while lesbian women recover 2.0 percent of their household 
income penalty.  
The correlation between reform and decreased rates of unemployment for lesbians and gays 
does not seem to be statistically significant, but it is of the same trend—odds of unemployment may 
be moving closer to levels of a comparable person in a heterosexual household. 
While the results cannot be said to be isolated from other economic and social factors, they 
are large and significant. Taking what we understand to be a history of wage penalties for gay males 
and wage premiums for lesbian women, protective reforms are positively correlated with closing the 
lesbian and gay household income gap.  
So, arises the question, why do protections for sexual-minorities seem to help gay men but 
hurt the personal income of lesbian women? This question is not a new one. Researchers have long 
used a human capital theory to explain the lesbian earnings premium—that is to say, because women 
are less likely to have children and less likely to work part time compared to full time, they are able 
to earn more (Badgett 2001; Badgett 1995). But Baumle and Poston (2011) found that even when 
controlling for these factors, the earnings premium persists. Baumle (2009) suggests that it is possible 
that employers perceive lesbians to have a greater labor force attainment than heterosexual women, 
but to us this seems inadequate in explain for the findings of such a large premium. Furthermore, 
there does not seem to be an obvious reason that legislative protection would reduce this false-
perception effect. Like Carpenter and Eppink (2017), we are reluctant to accept that improving 
attitudes toward LGBT is the main cause of the diminishing gay male earnings gap. Most central to 
this claim of ours is that increasing attitudes towards LGBT does not seem to be in line with 
decreasing personal earnings for lesbian women. This finding in particular suggests that there is more 
to the socioeconomic progress of American sexual minorities than increased acceptance. 
Thus, arises a second question of which we are also unable to answer: why does the lesbian 
earnings premium start to erode given protective legislation? In particular, we might look to the 
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emergence of legal protections and the emergence of equality in the eyes of the law. Carpenter and 
Eppink (2017) point to increasing access to same-sex marriage as plausibly affecting gay men more 
than lesbians. This claim is backed up by the finding that before same-sex marriage was legalized, 
lesbians were more likely to be in same-sex partnerships and formalized partnerships than gay men 
(Carpenter and Gates 2008). Just as they suggest marriage may have been more beneficial to gay men 
than lesbian women, it is plausible that anti-discrimination laws may benefit one gender of sexual 
minorities more than another. We can call this the “greater policy impact for gay men” hypothesis. 
To us, the most plausible cause for females and males to experience anti-discrimination laws 
differently, is that females and males experience discrimination differently. There is some evidence 
in the literature to support this theory. Madden and Kyei (2013) propose a “greater bias against gay 
men” hypothesis, in which stronger biases against gay men than against lesbians account for all or 
some of the gender differential in the gay pay gap. If that were to be the case, then the decline in bias 
should have stronger effects on the gay pay gap than the lesbian gap. This effect differential is apparent 
in our findings as well. Still though, this theory does not readily explain the decline in lesbian pay. 
Perhaps these legal protections lead to lesbian women feeling comfortable disclosing their 
identity to an employer when they were not comfortable before. If this were the case, by “coming 
out” in the workplace, lesbian women could be exposing themselves to pay discrimination that they 
did not face before. There is some data to support this theory. Badgett (2001) found that gays and 
lesbians were more likely to disclose their sexual orientation in the workplace when an employer had 
a non-discrimination policy in place. This suggests that individuals are more likely to disclose sexual 
orientation in environments where they feel protected. Thus, Baumle and Poston (2011) argue that 
those living in states without an anti-discrimination law could choose to avoid disclosing their sexual 
orientation and thereby avoid discrimination in the workplace. The decrease in lesbian pay following 
reform could feasibly be an effect of this dynamic. That being said, the evidence is yet to be 
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sufficiently convincing. This paradoxical relationship does convince us, however, that sexual 
orientation discrimination is a complex and at times nonintuitive subject matter. 
Most generally, this study presents numerous puzzles to social scientists. We find that lesbian 
women earn a substantial premium compared to heterosexual women and that protective legislation 
reduces their relative earnings. The theory of improving attitudes towards LGBT is incapable of 
explaining numerous recent findings including these, and while a theory of a greater policy impact 
for gay men seems more plausible, it remains unproven.  
It is important to consider a progressive understanding of gender norms in conjunction with 
attitudes towards LGBT. Tilcsik (2011) illustrated how conceptions of masculinity come into play 
with regards to hiring discrimination. It seems that if gender norms play a part in patterns of gay male 
discrimination, they are likely to play a part for lesbian females as well. This is further explored in 
the theory of unmeasured gender-linked characteristics (Madden and Kyei 2013; Klawitter and Flatt 
1998; Black et al. 2003).   This underscores the importance in considering gays and lesbians as 
separate populations in research, and also illustrates the need for more intersectional research. Not 
only do homosexual men and women experience opposite wage effects connected to their sexuality, 
but lesbian women experience the intersection of gender and sexuality in their labor market outcomes. 
More intersectional work would be valuable to the literature, but of course that requires new 
theoretical developments and more refineddata. 
This study’s findings may also be indicative of the kind of discrimination lesbian and gay 
people face, and the kind of discrimination successfully counteracted by legislative protections. 
Further research should be conducted on the various kinds of discrimination at play for gay and 
lesbian people. An audit study similar to that of Drydakis (2009) would be illuminating if conducted 
in the U.S. Tilcsik (2011) conducted the first major U.S. audit study of hiring discrimination for 
sexual-minorities, but its test sample was exclusively men. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The study aims to contribute to two discourses within the literature of queer socioeconomics: 
1) the effects of legislative protections for sexual minorities, and 2) the nature of the lesbian earnings 
premium. Overall, it seems as though anti-discrimination laws are reducing discrepancies in 
homosexual earnings, but we cannot clearly identify the reasons. Furthermore, we’ve learned a little 
bit more about the paradox(es) of the lesbian earnings gap. 
Looking back to Tilcsik (2011) we can say that this study adds to the discourse by analyzing 
multiple regions with respect to the same measure of outcome. His study was one of the few that did 
that, by sending resumes of “straight” or “gay” applicants to employers in seven geographically 
dispersed states. Similarly, this study is one of the few studies which looks at differences across states 
and time. In all of these states, what we are measuring is income and unemployment, as garnered 
from a federally conducted survey. In this sense, we are able to get away from issues that might arise 
given cross-study differences. Furthermore, this study looks simply at income and unemployment 
over a period of time where the one variable is the presence of a protective law. Tilcsik underlines 
the importance of a multistate study (2011, p. 615). 
That being said, the discrimination measure is not discrete—that is to say the measured impact 
of discrimination likely includes additional factors beyond the scope of employment. It is also worth 
emphasizing his point that discrimination in the hiring process is distinct and particularly hard to 
detect and prove in relation to discrimination occurring within the workplace. This point further 
extends to the idea that laws may have differing effects in reducing differing kinds of discrimination. 
In conducting a study such as this one, there is a clear need for better data. The current method 
of determining sexual minorities in the census is fraught with problems. Adding the ability to directly 
determine one’s sexual orientation and gender identity would surely clear up the arena of 
socioeconomic theories of sexual and gender minorities.7 Additionally, centralized resources like 
                                                        
7Census 2020 will not ask for sexual orientation, despite a push from researchers and policymakers. 
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UCLA’s Williams Institute and the Movement Advancement Project create greater access to research. 
There does not seem to exist a public database for statewide or countywide attitudinal changes 
towards LGBT people, although the data does seem to be out there from centers like Pew and Gallup  
While better data should be available (from the census, for example), more data would not 
necessarily reveal the entire picture which embodies the complex relationship between laws, attitudes 
and discrimination. Tilscik raises the example that even if anti-discrimination laws had no direct effect 
on discrimination (i.e. in job applications), they may reduce discrimination by improving public 
opinion of LGBT people. That being said, there is likely a causal effect in the opposite direction: 
more tolerant views towards LGBT leads to more legislative protection for LGBT people. We would 
like to isolate these attitudes from discrimination and recommend that a future study take this into 
consideration.  
Further studies like this one could incorporate attitudes of LGBT rights to further the analysis 
of the LGBT attitudes hypothesis. Additionally, there are many more indicators in many different 
geographies which can be examined. More than just income and unemployment, we can look at 
patterns of occupational segregation by gender and sexual orientation, location choices by sexual 
minorities, family patterns, or other broad economic indicators like access to healthcare, rent and 
housing prices, or even eviction rates. In addition to there being more indicators to look at, there are 
more levels to which we can look, as protective policies exist for people working in the federal 
government, certain counties and cities, as well as many large private employers. Especially ripe for 
study, one could examine how these indicators differ for people living in same-sex households in 
protective states versus nonprotective states. Finally, as said before, sexual orientation discrimination 
should be considered in respect to its intersections with gender and gender identity as well as race.  
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APPENDIX 
Table A1: Dataset descriptions. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2: Total same-sex couples in sample vs census in 2010.8 %∆= 0123456758090758090  𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒	 = (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒-𝑠𝑒𝑥	ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑠) ⋅ 100  
 
 
  
                                                        
8 This is a very rough estimate that does not include weighting. Census population is US Census Bureau’s state-level 
preferred estimates for same-sex couples. The preferred estimates adjust original Census tabulations reported in the 
Census 2010 SF-1, PCT15 to account for the likelihood that a small portion of different-sex couples miscode the sex of 
a spouse or partner and are incorrectly counted as a same-sex couple. 
 
  
STATE SAMPLE CENSUS % ∆ 
MARYLAND 12,400  12,538 -1.1% 
NEW YORK 47,600  48,932 -2.7% 
NEW MEXICO 6,200  5,825 6.4% 
ILLINOIS 22,900  23,049 -0.6% 
MAINE 4,400  3,958 11.2% 
WASHINGTON 17,100  19,003 -10.0% 
COLORADO 12,300  12,424 -1.0% 
IOWA 4,200  4,093 2.6% 
OREGON 10,100  11,773 -14.2% 
DELAWARE 3,100  2,645 17.2% 
“Sample” = ("#$%&	(%)*-(*,	ℎ#.(*ℎ#&/() ⋅ 100 
Census population is US Census Bureau’s state-level preferred estimates for same-
sex couples. The preferred estimates adjust original Census tabulations reported in 
the Census 2010 SF-1, PCT15 to account for the likelihood that a small portion of 
different-sex couples miscode the sex of a spouse or partner and are incorrectly 
counted as a same-sex couple.  %∆	= !"#$%&'(&)!*!(&)!*!   
 
 
Total Same-Sex Couples in Sample vs. Census 
 
 
                                                        
1 This dataset was selected because the smallest identifiable area is the Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA), 
containing at least 100,000 persons. This is the same area constraint for the ACS from 2005 and on. 
DATASET SAMPLING RATIO 
2000 5%1 5.00% 
2001 ACS 0.43% 
2002 ACS 0.38% 
2003 ACS 0.42% 
2004 ACS 0.42% 
2005 ACS 1.00% 
2006 ACS 1.00% 
2007 ACS 1.00% 
2008 ACS 1.00% 
2009 ACS 1.00% 
2010 ACS 1.00% 
2011 ACS 1.00% 
2012 ACS 1.00% 
2013 ACS 1.00% 
2014 ACS 1.00% 
2015 ACS 1.00% 
2016 ACS 1.00% 
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Testing the Reform Variable -- NM and CO (2000-2007)
Dependent variable:
log(Personal INCOME) log(HH INCOME) Unemployment
OLS OLS logistic
NM CO NM CO NM CO
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Intercept) 6.125*** 6.491*** 10.507*** 10.760*** 0.146 0.325***
(0.076) (0.043) (0.032) (0.020) (0.143) (0.098)
Same Sex HH -0.294** -0.405*** -0.178*** -0.084*** 0.237 0.370**
(0.133) (0.071) (0.056) (0.032) (0.263) (0.182)
Sex (female) -0.801*** -0.752*** 0.044*** 0.040*** 0.069 0.112***
(0.021) (0.011) (0.009) (0.005) (0.044) (0.034)
Age 0.151*** 0.139*** 0.005*** 0.010*** -0.100*** -0.112***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.005)
Age squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.00002 -0.0001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.00004) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Black -0.114 -0.105*** -0.166*** -0.160*** 0.454*** 0.783***
(0.072) (0.030) (0.030) (0.013) (0.146) (0.064)
Am. Indian / Alaska
Native -0.315*** -0.173*** -0.232*** -0.195*** 0.900*** 0.613***
(0.032) (0.048) (0.014) (0.022) (0.056) (0.103)
Asian or Pacific
Islander -0.118 -0.109*** 0.035 -0.087*** 0.083 0.396***
(0.072) (0.029) (0.030) (0.013) (0.181) (0.076)
Other Race -0.002 -0.035* -0.032*** -0.045*** 0.173*** 0.213***
(0.024) (0.020) (0.010) (0.009) (0.049) (0.048)
Hispanic or Latinx -0.009 -0.112*** -0.140*** -0.219*** 0.100** 0.170***
(0.021) (0.016) (0.009) (0.007) (0.046) (0.040)
Highschool 0.572*** 0.676*** 0.196*** 0.051*** -0.549*** -0.428***
(0.026) (0.017) (0.011) (0.008) (0.046) (0.037)
Some College 0.770*** 0.862*** 0.310*** 0.158*** -0.909*** -0.713***
(0.027) (0.017) (0.011) (0.008) (0.052) (0.041)
Associates Degree 0.948*** 0.926*** 0.398*** 0.197*** -1.034*** -0.772***
(0.038) (0.022) (0.016) (0.010) (0.090) (0.060)
Bachelor's Degree 1.110*** 1.202*** 0.559*** 0.396*** -1.202*** -1.028***
(0.031) (0.018) (0.013) (0.008) (0.076) (0.047)
Master's Degree 1.334*** 1.368*** 0.721*** 0.526*** -1.480*** -1.008***
(0.038) (0.021) (0.016) (0.010) (0.121) (0.066)
Professional Degree 1.658*** 1.668*** 1.002*** 0.776*** -1.332*** -1.758***
(0.064) (0.032) (0.027) (0.015) (0.215) (0.163)
Doctoral Degree 1.605*** 1.566*** 0.937*** 0.684*** -1.462*** -1.266***
(0.065) (0.041) (0.027) (0.019) (0.242) (0.172)
Unemployment -2.760*** -2.609*** -0.327*** -0.273***
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Unemployment -2.760*** -2.609*** -0.327*** -0.273***
(0.035) (0.022) (0.015) (0.010)
Post Reform -0.019 0.034 0.155*** 0.116*** -0.352*** -0.374***
(0.046) (0.026) (0.020) (0.012) (0.108) (0.068)
2000 -0.385*** -0.256*** -0.136*** -0.116*** -0.034 -0.752***
(0.038) (0.022) (0.016) (0.010) (0.084) (0.056)
2001 -0.134*** -0.004 -0.080*** -0.044*** -0.149 -0.394***
(0.050) (0.031) (0.021) (0.014) (0.114) (0.081)
2002 0.013 0.020 -0.014 -0.015 0.069 -0.100
(0.053) (0.031) (0.022) (0.014) (0.115) (0.077)
2003
2004 -0.083* -0.085*** -0.133*** -0.090*** 0.435*** 0.284***
(0.044) (0.025) (0.019) (0.011) (0.098) (0.065)
2005 -0.058 -0.125*** -0.099*** -0.091*** 0.239*** 0.185***
(0.035) (0.018) (0.015) (0.008) (0.084) (0.050)
2006 -0.021 -0.054*** -0.027* -0.040*** 0.170** -0.003
(0.035) (0.018) (0.015) (0.008) (0.085) (0.052)
2007
Same Sex
HH*Female 0.800*** 0.766*** 0.027 -0.037 -0.406 -0.328
(0.183) (0.098) (0.077) (0.044) (0.395) (0.277)
Same Sex
HH*Reform 0.176 0.227** 0.218** 0.135*** -0.041 -0.360
(0.205) (0.111) (0.087) (0.050) (0.442) (0.311)
Female*Reform 0.224*** 0.092*** -0.002 -0.019** 0.201*** 0.032
(0.034) (0.018) (0.014) (0.008) (0.076) (0.052)
Same Sex
HH*Reform*Female -0.477* -0.388** -0.217* -0.098 0.173 0.342
(0.280) (0.155) (0.118) (0.070) (0.638) (0.437)
Observations 59,116 161,367 59,116 161,367 59,116 161,367
R2 0.268 0.252 0.148 0.107
Adjusted R2 0.268 0.252 0.147 0.107
Akaike Inf. Crit. 24,628.100 51,894.960
F Statistic 773.745*** (df= 28; 59087)
1,943.547*** (df
= 28; 161338)
365.574*** (df
= 28; 59087)
690.203*** (df
= 28; 161338)
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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Testing the Reform Variable -- MD and DE (2000-2009)
Dependent variable:
log(Personal INCOME) log(HH INCOME) Unemployment
OLS OLS logistic
MD DE MD DE MD DE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Intercept) 6.347*** 6.420*** 10.997*** 10.834*** -0.207** -0.360**
(0.033) (0.066) (0.014) (0.029) (0.090) (0.174)
Same Sex HH -0.168** -0.208 0.039 0.117* 0.554*** 0.163
(0.066) (0.149) (0.029) (0.065) (0.186) (0.523)
Sex (female) -0.613*** -0.618*** 0.031*** 0.036*** 0.088** 0.040
(0.010) (0.023) (0.004) (0.010) (0.035) (0.084)
Age 0.146*** 0.144*** -0.001** 0.005*** -0.107*** -0.110***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.008)
Age squared -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.00004*** -0.00005*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.00002) (0.00003) (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00005) (0.0001)
Black -0.102*** -0.201*** -0.107*** -0.179*** 0.805*** 0.722***
(0.009) (0.022) (0.004) (0.010) (0.024) (0.059)
Am. Indian / Alaska
Native -0.118* -0.320*** -0.038 -0.417*** 0.568*** 0.104
(0.062) (0.118) (0.027) (0.052) (0.162) (0.368)
Asian or Pacific
Islander -0.314*** -0.247*** -0.129*** -0.134*** 0.381*** 0.492***
(0.015) (0.044) (0.006) (0.019) (0.050) (0.141)
Other Race -0.076*** -0.106** -0.071*** -0.150*** 0.292*** 0.241*
(0.021) (0.051) (0.009) (0.022) (0.058) (0.139)
Hispanic or Latinx -0.124*** -0.095** -0.110*** -0.207*** 0.097* 0.046
(0.018) (0.043) (0.008) (0.019) (0.051) (0.117)
Highschool 0.597*** 0.606*** 0.083*** 0.121*** -0.488*** -0.382***
(0.013) (0.026) (0.005) (0.011) (0.030) (0.066)
Some College 0.806*** 0.748*** 0.243*** 0.240*** -0.898*** -0.727***
(0.013) (0.027) (0.006) (0.012) (0.034) (0.075)
Associates Degree 0.907*** 0.878*** 0.287*** 0.325*** -1.090*** -0.964***
(0.017) (0.034) (0.007) (0.015) (0.057) (0.118)
Bachelor's Degree 1.181*** 1.150*** 0.486*** 0.491*** -1.193*** -1.121***
(0.013) (0.028) (0.006) (0.012) (0.039) (0.091)
Master's Degree 1.347*** 1.289*** 0.614*** 0.625*** -1.320*** -1.334***
(0.015) (0.034) (0.006) (0.015) (0.054) (0.136)
Professional Degree 1.702*** 1.619*** 0.908*** 0.889*** -1.520*** -1.360***
(0.020) (0.053) (0.009) (0.023) (0.093) (0.246)
Doctoral Degree 1.488*** 1.534*** 0.709*** 0.840*** -1.482*** -1.548***
(0.023) (0.059) (0.010) (0.026) (0.110) (0.299)
Unemployment -3.200*** -2.553*** -0.339*** -0.303***
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Unemployment -3.200*** -2.553*** -0.339*** -0.303***
(0.017) (0.035) (0.007) (0.015)
Post Reform 0.119*** 0.072* 0.275*** 0.196*** 0.635*** 0.828***
(0.021) (0.039) (0.009) (0.017) (0.067) (0.121)
2000 -0.200*** -0.186*** -0.041*** -0.075*** -0.198*** -0.179*
(0.018) (0.028) (0.008) (0.012) (0.060) (0.099)
2001
2002 -0.148*** -0.035 -0.249*** -0.144*** -0.344*** -0.493***
(0.021) (0.036) (0.009) (0.016) (0.061) (0.104)
2003 -0.153*** -0.059* -0.207*** -0.113*** -0.303*** -0.396***
(0.020) (0.036) (0.009) (0.016) (0.057) (0.101)
2004 -0.143*** -0.070* -0.181*** -0.122*** -0.414*** -0.365***
(0.020) (0.036) (0.009) (0.016) (0.060) (0.101)
2005 -0.082*** -0.056 -0.119*** -0.089*** -0.505*** -0.550***
(0.015) (0.038) (0.007) (0.017) (0.046) (0.113)
2006 -0.050*** -0.006 -0.083*** -0.053*** -0.569*** -0.555***
(0.015) (0.038) (0.007) (0.017) (0.047) (0.114)
2007 -0.014 -0.033 -0.019*** -0.027* -0.460*** -0.605***
(0.015) (0.038) (0.007) (0.017) (0.045) (0.114)
2008 -0.010 0.023 -0.008 0.013 -0.565*** -0.412***
(0.015) (0.038) (0.007) (0.017) (0.046) (0.109)
2009
Same Sex
HH*Female 0.374*** 0.706*** -0.179*** -0.209** -0.617** 0.326
(0.091) (0.217) (0.039) (0.095) (0.294) (0.706)
Same Sex
HH*Reform -0.031 -0.024 -0.001 -0.065 -0.081 -0.274
(0.088) (0.182) (0.038) (0.080) (0.245) (0.653)
Female*Reform 0.067*** 0.048* -0.014** -0.038*** -0.073* -0.124
(0.013) (0.029) (0.006) (0.013) (0.044) (0.102)
Same Sex
HH*Reform*Female 0.107 -0.177 0.039 0.080 0.157 0.048
(0.121) (0.268) (0.052) (0.118) (0.379) (0.888)
Observations 239,793 43,963 239,793 43,963 239,793 43,963
R2 0.317 0.300 0.166 0.157
Adjusted R2 0.317 0.300 0.166 0.156
Akaike Inf. Crit. 73,853.770 15,229.260
F Statistic
3,717.771***
(df = 30;
239762)
628.775***
(df = 30;
43932)
1,591.896***
(df = 30;
239762)
272.098*** (df
= 30; 43932)
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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 Table A5: Expanded female regression including state and year dummies. 
  Females in 10 States 2000-2016
Dependent variable:
log(Personal Income) log(Household Income) Unemployment
OLS OLS logistic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(Intercept) 9.960*** 8.518*** 8.517*** 11.270*** 9.241*** 9.241*** -3.093*** -.620*** -.620***
(.002) (.019) (.019) (.001) (.008) (.008) (.004) (.052) (.052)
Same Sex HH .386*** .279*** .324*** -.015*** -.088*** -.100*** .013 .055* .103*
(.012) (.011) (.018) (.005) (.005) (.008) (.032) (.033) (.055)
Age .040*** .040*** .074*** .074*** -.065*** -.065***
(.001) (.001) (.0003) (.0003) (.002) (.002)
Age squared -.0003*** -.0003*** -.001*** -.001*** .0005*** .0005***
(.00001) (.00001) (0.00000) (0.00000) (.00002) (.00002)
Black .104*** .104*** -.141*** -.141*** .595*** .595***
(.006) (.006) (.002) (.002) (.014) (.014)
Am. Indian /
Alaska Native -.052*** -.052*** -.221*** -.220*** .670*** .670***
(.016) (.016) (.007) (.007) (.034) (.034)
Asian or
Pacific Islander -.100*** -.100*** -.042*** -.042*** .305*** .305***
(.006) (.006) (.003) (.003) (.017) (.017)
Other Race -.079*** -.079*** -.074*** -.074*** .244*** .244***
(.007) (.007) (.003) (.003) (.018) (.018)
Hispanic or
Latinx -.096*** -.096*** -.058*** -.058*** .297*** .297***
(.006) (.006) (.003) (.003) (.015) (.015)
Highschool .384*** .384*** .223*** .223*** -.578*** -.578***
(.006) (.006) (.003) (.003) (.014) (.014)
Some College .572*** .572*** .365*** .365*** -.774*** -.774***
(.006) (.006) (.003) (.003) (.014) (.014)
Associates
Degree .719*** .719*** .447*** .447*** -1.091*** -1.091***
(.007) (.007) (.003) (.003) (.018) (.018)
Bachelor's
Degree .971*** .971*** .689*** .689*** -1.226*** -1.226***
(.006) (.006) (.003) (.003) (.015) (.015)
Master's
Degree 1.218*** 1.218*** .821*** .821*** -1.463*** -1.463***
(.007) (.007) (.003) (.003) (.019) (.019)
Professional
Degree 1.551*** 1.551*** 1.100*** 1.100*** -1.572*** -1.572***
(.010) (.010) (.004) (.004) (.038) (.038)
Doctoral
Degree 1.477*** 1.477*** 1.014*** 1.014*** -1.658*** -1.658***
(.013) (.013) (.005) (.005) (.053) (.053)
Unemployment -3.688*** -3.688*** -.503*** -.503***
(.007) (.007) (.003) (.003)
Post Reform .007 .008 -.002 -.002 -.098*** -.096***
(.007) (.007) (.003) (.003) (.020) (.020)
2000 -.534*** -.534*** -.342*** -.342*** -.183*** -.183***
(.009) (.009) (.004) (.004) (.029) (.029)
2001 -.267*** -.267*** -.280*** -.280*** -.023 -.023
(.012) (.012) (.005) (.005) (.040) (.040)
2002 -.224*** -.225*** -.264*** -.264*** .254*** .254***
(.012) (.012) (.005) (.005) (.038) (.038)
2003 -.219*** -.219*** -.250*** -.250*** .263*** .262***
(.011) (.011) (.005) (.005) (.035) (.035)
2004 -.213*** -.213*** -.225*** -.225*** .278*** .277***
(.011) (.011) (.005) (.005) (.035) (.035)
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2005 -.206*** -.207*** -.223*** -.223*** .197*** .197***
(.009) (.009) (.004) (.004) (.029) (.029)
2006 -.177*** -.177*** -.186*** -.186*** .114*** .114***
(.008) (.008) (.004) (.004) (.027) (.027)
2007 -.144*** -.144*** -.147*** -.147*** .054** .054**
(.008) (.008) (.003) (.003) (.027) (.027)
2008 -.118*** -.118*** -.119*** -.119*** .003 .003
(.008) (.008) (.003) (.003) (.027) (.027)
2009 -.080*** -.080*** -.119*** -.119*** .525*** .525***
(.008) (.008) (.003) (.003) (.025) (.025)
2010 -.083*** -.083*** -.141*** -.141*** .663*** .663***
(.008) (.008) (.003) (.003) (.024) (.024)
2011 -.100*** -.100*** -.142*** -.142*** .654*** .654***
(.008) (.008) (.003) (.003) (.024) (.024)
2012 -.101*** -.101*** -.118*** -.118*** .543*** .543***
(.008) (.008) (.003) (.003) (.025) (.025)
2013 -.081*** -.081*** -.088*** -.088*** .430*** .429***
(.008) (.008) (.003) (.003) (.025) (.025)
2014 -.073*** -.073*** -.070*** -.070*** .246*** .246***
(.008) (.008) (.003) (.003) (.026) (.026)
2015 -.045*** -.045*** -.034*** -.034*** .093*** .093***
(.008) (.008) (.003) (.003) (.027) (.027)
2016
Colorado -.033*** -.033*** -.009*** -.009*** -.156*** -.156***
(.006) (.006) (.003) (.003) (.018) (.018)
Illinois .114*** .114*** .057*** .057*** -.225*** -.225***
(.011) (.011) (.005) (.005) (.034) (.034)
Iowa -.018*** -.018*** .010*** .010*** -.029** -.029**
(.005) (.005) (.002) (.002) (.014) (.014)
Maine -.085*** -.085*** -.153*** -.153*** -.538*** -.538***
(.007) (.007) (.003) (.003) (.023) (.023)
Maryland -.117*** -.117*** -.209*** -.209*** -.150*** -.150***
(.009) (.009) (.004) (.004) (.029) (.029)
New Mexico .157*** .157*** .176*** .176*** -.286*** -.286***
(.006) (.006) (.003) (.003) (.019) (.019)
New York -.140*** -.140*** -.157*** -.157*** -.128*** -.128***
(.009) (.009) (.004) (.004) (.026) (.026)
Oregon .041*** .041*** .039*** .039*** -.020 -.020
(.005) (.005) (.002) (.002) (.014) (.014)
Washington -.082*** -.082*** -.116*** -.116*** .071*** .071***
(.007) (.007) (.003) (.003) (.019) (.019)
Delaware
Same Sex
HH*Reform -.069*** .020** -.074
(.023) (.010) (.068)
Observations 1,548,464 1,548,464 1,548,464 1,548,464 1,548,464 1,548,464 1,548,464 1,548,464 1,548,464
R2 .001 .238 .238 .00001 .237 .237
Adjusted R2 .001 .238 .238 0.00000 .237 .237
Akaike Inf.
Crit. 553,047.900 527,404.700 527,405.600
F Statistic
957.387***
(df = 1;
1548462)
11,507.140***
(df = 42;
1548421)
11,239.810***
(df = 43;
1548420)
7.844***
(df = 1;
1548462)
11,482.550***
(df = 42;
1548421)
11,215.630***
(df = 43;
1548420)
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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Table A6: Expanded male regression including state and year dummies. 
  
Males in 10 States 2000-2016
Dependent variable:
log(Personal Income) log(Household Income) Unemployment
OLS OLS logistic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(Intercept) 10.653*** 8.883*** 8.884*** 11.246*** 9.351*** 9.352*** -3.178*** -1.667*** -1.666***
(0.001) (0.014) (0.014) (0.001) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.050) (0.050)
Same Sex HH -0.169*** -0.255*** -0.337*** 0.196*** 0.114*** 0.069*** 0.162*** 0.297*** 0.260***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.015) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.032) (0.032) (0.056)
Age 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.066*** 0.066*** -0.048*** -0.048***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.002) (0.002)
Age squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.0005*** 0.0005***
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00002) (0.00002)
Black -0.391*** -0.391*** -0.115*** -0.115*** 0.727*** 0.727***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) (0.013)
Am. Indian /
Alaska Native -0.346*** -0.346*** -0.199*** -0.199*** 0.842*** 0.842***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.031) (0.031)
Asian or
Pacific Islander -0.301*** -0.301*** -0.188*** -0.188*** 0.135*** 0.135***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.019) (0.019)
Other Race -0.150*** -0.150*** -0.092*** -0.092*** 0.207*** 0.207***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.018) (0.018)
Hispanic or
Latinx -0.131*** -0.131*** -0.122*** -0.122*** -0.053*** -0.053***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.015) (0.015)
Highschool 0.290*** 0.290*** 0.213*** 0.213*** -0.466*** -0.466***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.012) (0.012)
Some College 0.472*** 0.472*** 0.380*** 0.380*** -0.680*** -0.680***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) (0.013)
Associates
Degree 0.523*** 0.523*** 0.421*** 0.421*** -0.890*** -0.890***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.017) (0.017)
Bachelor's
Degree 0.861*** 0.861*** 0.704*** 0.704*** -1.159*** -1.160***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.014) (0.014)
Master's
Degree 1.027*** 1.026*** 0.828*** 0.828*** -1.263*** -1.263***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.019) (0.019)
Professional
Degree 1.451*** 1.451*** 1.183*** 1.183*** -1.970*** -1.970***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.037) (0.037)
Doctoral
Degree 1.165*** 1.164*** 0.938*** 0.938*** -1.674*** -1.674***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.042) (0.042)
Unemployment -2.327*** -2.327*** -0.609*** -0.609***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Post Reform 0.017*** 0.016*** -0.0001 -0.001 -0.010 -0.011
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.020) (0.020)
2000 -0.333*** -0.333*** -0.389*** -0.389*** 0.018 0.018
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.029) (0.029)
2001 -0.201*** -0.201*** -0.324*** -0.324*** 0.147*** 0.147***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.039) (0.039)
2002 -0.169*** -0.169*** -0.294*** -0.294*** 0.496*** 0.496***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.036) (0.036)
2003 -0.184*** -0.184*** -0.287*** -0.287*** 0.494*** 0.494***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.033) (0.033)
2004 -0.177*** -0.177*** -0.266*** -0.266*** 0.396*** 0.396***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.033) (0.033)
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2005 -0.160*** -0.160*** -0.246*** -0.246*** 0.236*** 0.236***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.028) (0.028)
2006 -0.128*** -0.128*** -0.208*** -0.208*** 0.051* 0.051*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.027) (0.027)
2007 -0.097*** -0.096*** -0.168*** -0.168*** 0.089*** 0.089***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.026) (0.026)
2008 -0.088*** -0.087*** -0.140*** -0.140*** 0.053** 0.053**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.026) (0.026)
2009 -0.059*** -0.059*** -0.128*** -0.128*** 0.750*** 0.750***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.023) (0.023)
2010 -0.122*** -0.122*** -0.152*** -0.152*** 0.892*** 0.892***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.023) (0.023)
2011 -0.140*** -0.140*** -0.152*** -0.152*** 0.757*** 0.757***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.023) (0.023)
2012 -0.115*** -0.115*** -0.126*** -0.126*** 0.628*** 0.628***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.024) (0.024)
2013 -0.085*** -0.085*** -0.095*** -0.095*** 0.491*** 0.491***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.024) (0.024)
2014 -0.073*** -0.073*** -0.075*** -0.075*** 0.262*** 0.262***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.025) (0.025)
2015 -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.033*** 0.094*** 0.094***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.026) (0.026)
2016
Colorado -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.197*** -0.197***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.018) (0.018)
Illinois 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.077*** 0.077*** -0.275*** -0.275***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.033) (0.033)
Iowa 0.008** 0.008** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.026* 0.026*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.014) (0.014)
Maine -0.187*** -0.187*** -0.124*** -0.125*** -0.506*** -0.506***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.022) (0.022)
Maryland -0.233*** -0.233*** -0.180*** -0.180*** -0.084*** -0.084***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.027) (0.027)
New Mexico 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.177*** 0.177*** -0.439*** -0.439***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.018) (0.018)
New York -0.171*** -0.171*** -0.148*** -0.148*** -0.095*** -0.095***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.025) (0.025)
Oregon -0.013*** -0.013*** 0.060*** 0.060*** -0.031** -0.031**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) (0.013)
Washington -0.148*** -0.148*** -0.114*** -0.114*** 0.173*** 0.173***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.017) (0.017)
Delaware
Same Sex
HH*Reform 0.128*** 0.071*** 0.056
(0.019) (0.011) (0.068)
Observations 1,845,672 1,845,672 1,845,672 1,845,672 1,845,672 1,845,672 1,845,672 1,845,672 1,845,672
R2 0.0002 0.208 0.208 0.001 0.240 0.240
Adjusted R2 0.0002 0.208 0.208 0.001 0.240 0.240
Akaike Inf.
Crit. 620,961.800 594,698.500 594,699.800
F Statistic
284.523***
(df = 1;
1845670)
11,518.870***
(df = 42;
1845629)
11,252.390***
(df = 43;
1845628)
1,097.858***
(df = 1;
1845670)
13,857.870***
(df = 42;
1845629)
13,536.910***
(df = 43;
1845628)
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Table A6 (continued)  
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